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ABSTRACT
Using a sample of twenty nine African countries for which adequate time series data are 
available this paper explores the nexus between financial development and manufactured 
exports. This particular relationship is especially important in the context of Africa since export 
diversification away from resources and agriculture is an important part of Africa’s growth 
strategy. Our results show that in eleven countries financial development causes manufactured 
exports and manufactured exports causes financial development in seven countries. We then 
explore reasons for these findings and find that a rich and surprising set of factors explain our 
findings. 
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2I. Introduction
Increasing manufactured exports of African countries is widely recognized as an important 
endeavor, as Africa strives to promote productivity and economic growth through diversification
of exports away from commodities and agriculture.  As a result, a small but burgeoning literature 
has set out to explore what factors are responsible for the growth of manufactured exports from 
Africa, as depicted in Figure 1.  Of particular interest has been an attempt to understand how 
financial development has contributed to greater manufactured exports. This is because of a 
growing body of evidence that financial growth has many other beneficial effects including a 
direct bearing on poverty alleviation (Mookerjee and Kalipioni (2010). However much of the 
empirical work that attempts to establish the link between financial development and 
manufactured exports relies on panel data analysis where studies assume the direction of 
causality is from finance to growth, with controls for possible reverse causality. However it is 
now well understood that panel regressions have serious issues with controlling for reverse 
causality and downplaying the unique characteristics of a particular country.
As a result in this paper we set out to explore the direction of causality between financial 
development and manufactured exports for a sample of twenty nine African countries with time 
series data for each country. Our results show that it is incorrect to assume that finance always 
causes manufactured exports. For a significant number of countries in our sample the causation 
is from manufactured exports to finance. We provide some evidence on why the causal 
relationship varies across our sample of countries. 
3The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section II, we provide a brief review of the 
extant literature.  In section III we present and discuss our causality test results and explore the 
reasons for our findings. In section IV we present a summary.   
II. Literature Review
Understanding the relationship between financial development and trade has received increasing 
attention since the theoretical work of Kletze and Bardhan (1987). In particular, Kletze and 
Bardhan predicted that a well developed financial sector can increase a country’s comparative 
advantage in industries that rely more on external financing.  Subsequent empirical studies have 
relied on the assumption that causality runs from financial development to trade (Beck, 2002, 
2003; Hur, Raj and Riyanto, 2006; Huang and Temple, 2005; Svaleryd and Valchos, 2002). 
Nonetheless, there is the possibility that trade may cause financial development or both trade and 
financial development may simultaneously be caused by a third factor [such as favorable market 
oriented policies or unfavorable government policies]. For example, both Beck (2003) and 
Huang and Temple (2005), postulate that the relationship between trade and financial 
development maybe demand driven. In other words, countries with specialized production in 
sectors with scale economies may demand external finance, thereby, promoting financial 
development. While some of these studies have attempted to address the causality question 
(Huang and Temple, 2005; Svaleryd and Valchos, 2002), others (Beck (2002, 2003) have simply 
recognized the “potential” for reverse causality and, as a result, have attempted to impose control 
measures in the panel regression analysis.  
4III. Methodology and Results Analysis 
Using time series data, we test the causality between trade in manufactured products and 
financial development in twenty nine African countries. For each country we employ annual data 
covering the period 1975 to 2005. All data were first differenced to ensure stationarity as per the 
augmented Dickey Fuller tests. Following Beck (2002) we use PRIVATE CREDIT as the most 
appropriate proxy for financial development. For all the causality tests we use four lags. We also 
employed two lags but the results did not change. The significance of the causality tests are 
gleaned from the probability of the joint F- statistic.
As reported in Table 1, we find that in seven of those countries (group A), trade causes financial 
development; in eleven of them (group B) financial development causes trade and in the 
remaining eleven countries we do not find any causality between trade and financial 
development.  To understand why the direction of causality is different between countries in 
groups A and B we explore the unique characteristics within these groups of countries that 
potentially explain the causality result findings, and compare our findings to previous studies 
such as Huang and Temple, (2005) Svaleryd and Valchos, (2002).
3.1. Legal Origin:
La Porta et al (1998) argue that the legal structure of a country is closely related to a country’s 
colonial ties. For example, while the English common law tradition protects the rights of the 
shareholders and creditors, the French civil code is associated with less efficient contract 
enforcement, weaker investors’ protection and higher competition.  As a result we would expect 
those African countries in our sample that have a French civil code tradition to have shallower 
5and less developed financial systems and hence finance would have less of an impact in 
promoting exports.  A larger percentage (71%) of countries in group A, have the French civil 
code, compared to only 55% of the countries in group B, where the causality results show 
finance causing manufactured exports (Table 2). 
3.2. Quality of Institutions:
The most comprehensive data on African governance is the Ibrahim Index of African 
Governance (2012) that scores and ranks African countries based on the quality of their 
institutions for the period of 2000 to 2011. We compare the 2011 overall ranking and the change 
in the quality of related institutional variables between 2000 and 2011.   Based on this data, we 
do not observe any single group possessing superior institutional qualities in the broad categories 
of (i) safety and rule of law, (ii) sustainable economic opportunity and (iii) human development. 
So it appears that Institutional quality is not important in explaining our causal findings.  This 
finding is similar to earlier studies by Rajan and Zingales (2003) who found that common law 
legal codes have not always been associated with greater financial development. In addition, 
other studies focusing on determinants of financial development in Africa, do not find any 
meaningful relationship between broad measures of institutional quality and financial 
development relative to other developing countries (Allen et. al., 2012). 
3.3. Export Composition:
Table 2 also classifies the countries on the basis of export composition and whether or not they 
have a diversified export structure. All the countries in group A have a specialized export 
structure: 29% export mainly oil, 43%, non-fuel primary products and 29% export mainly 
6services. By contrast, 55% of countries in group B have a more diversified export basket. The 
remaining 36% and 9% are exporters of non-fuel primary products and oil respectively. Thus it 
appears that the more diversified the export base, Group B countries, the more important is the 
role of finance in promoting manufactured export growth. 
3.4. Export Concentration:
Next, we ask if the concentration of exports can explain our causal findings. The Export 
concentration index reflects the degree to which a country is dependent on exports. A 
concentration index close to zero implies that a country is more export dependent. Conversely, 
the export diversification index measures the depth of a country’s export basket. A country 
whose exports consist of a large number of products and trades with several countries has a 
lower export diversification index. Trends in the two indices for the 1990-2010 period are 
reflected in Figure 2. The export concentration index for the countries in group A range between 
0.3 and 0.5 [with the exception of Nigeria, which has a relatively higher concentration index of 
about 0.8 to 0.9] (Figure 2.1A). Their diversification index falls between 0.7 and 0.9 (Figure 
2.2A). 
The export concentration and diversification indices for group B countries are slightly lower. 
Their concentration index lies between 0.1 and 0.5 and their diversification index averages 
between 0.35 and 0.75. While these values are not as low as those of the Asian and Latin 
American and Caribbean countries that are more open and well diversified, group B relative to 
group A shows a higher degree of openness and diversification.  
73.5. Level of Financial Development:
An export diversification strategy requires that external financing options for export oriented 
industries are made available especially to small and medium firms that have limited internal 
financing. This is made possible if the financial sector is more developed, allowing more 
financing opportunities for new and innovative entrepreneurs who might have the potential to 
develop new export products. Consequently, because of their lower export diversification index, 
we can infer that group B countries have a more developed financial sector relative to group A. 
To further substantiate this claim, we evaluate percentage changes in measures of financial 
development: the ratio of liquid liabilities in the banking system to GDP (M2) and the ratio of 
credit to private sector to GDP. We use data for 1990 and 2005; almost a decade after the 
initiation of the financial sector reforms through the IMF/World Bank structural adjustment 
programs and three years before the 2008 world financial crisis. We find that 87% of group B 
countries experienced some growth in M2 between 1990 and 2005, with the growth values 
ranging from 7% in Central African Republic to 93% in Burundi. On the contrary only 67% of 
the countries in group A experienced some growth in their M2 (Table 3). With reference to the 
ratio of credit to private sector, 43% of the countries in group B had a positive growth relative to 
50% in group A. Nonetheless, group A countries experienced a substantial decline in the growth 
of credit to private sector relative to group B.  
The lending rate is another indicator of the level of financial market development in a country. It 
is defined as the sum of payments to depositors and operational costs, weighted by the proportion 
of defaults on loans. This rate becomes unpredictable in the presence of asymmetric information 
8where financial intermediaries cannot establish apriori the probability of default among 
borrowers. According to the learning model (Ordonez, 2012), idiosyncratic shocks to the 
economy are observable to borrowers for free but to the financial intermediaries at a cost. 
Consequently, the movement in the lending rates over time reflects the financial frictions created 
by the costly borrowers’ verification costs. Because of this asymmetric information, which is 
pervasive in countries with less developed financial markets, financial intermediaries set the 
lending rate based on their expected productivity or success of any given investment. However, 
as the financial sector becomes progressively more developed, the efficiency of intermediation is 
increased with the reduction in information, transaction and monitoring costs (Creane, Goyal, 
Mobarak and Sab, 2004). As a result, we expect less volatility in the movements of the lending 
rate in countries with relatively developed financial markets and vis-à-vis. 
Figures 3A and 3B track the trends in the lending rate between 1960 and 2010 for the countries 
in group A and B respectively. Some countries are omitted in both groups due to lack of data. 
Nevertheless, most countries in group A are characterized by wide swings in the lending rate 
relative to the countries in group B (with the exception of Tanzania, between 1985 and 1998).  
The stability in the movement of the lending rate in group B countries (Figure 3B) is another 
indicator that these countries have a relatively better developed financial market. 
As previously mentioned, the endogenous learning process of financial intermediaries about the 
state of the economy is what generates asymmetric movements of the lending rate. This in turn 
translates into movements in investment and consequently output. The asymmetric movement of 
these economic variables is more pronounced in countries with weaker financial systems 
9(Ordonez, 2012). Higher expectations of loan defaults, implies that the only investments to be 
funded are those with proven record of success and high returns. Braun (2003) also found that 
industries with more “tangible assets” are relatively larger in size and grow relatively faster than 
industries with intangible assets in countries with low level of financial development.  This 
alludes further to the selective nature of the financial intermediaries in countries with less 
developed financial markets.
In Figure 4 we provide the trends of the share of manufactures output with varying skill levels 
and technology intensity in total manufacturing output. The earliest available data starts from 
1995. Figures 4.1A to 4.3A track the trends in the countries in group A for low, medium and 
high skill respectively. The manufacturing output in subsectors using low (Figure 4.1A) and 
medium skill (Figure 4.2A) is very volatile relative to that in the subsector employing high skill 
labor (Figure 4.3A).  Conversely, Figures 4.1B, 3.2B and 4.3B show that countries in group B 
have more stable output in all the three subsectors. If the skill level can be used as a proxy for 
productivity in the three subsectors and assuming that all the three subsectors rely on some form 
of external financing, then we can conclude that financial intermediaries in group A are more 
selective and biased towards more productive, high skill subsector.  On the contrary, financial 
intermediaries in group B countries are less biased and less selective in investment funding as 
evidenced by the stability over time in output in all the three subsectors. Henceforth, we can also 
infer that countries in group B have a better developed financial sector relative to countries in 
group A.
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3.6. Political Structure:
A stable and market friendly governance is necessary not only for sound financial institutions but 
also for an investment friendly environment. While government regulations are necessary to 
ensure effective contract enforcement and transparency in accounting and disclosure (Rajan and 
Zingales, 2003), repressive governments can also impose restrictions and price distortions on the 
financial market with the purpose of using it as a source of public finance. 
Repressive financial market policies such as high inflation taxation, high required reserve ratio, 
subsidized or directed credit, collusive contracts between public enterprises and banks and other 
rent seeking practices are more likely to be found in unstable and autocratic leaning 
governments. Figure 5 shows that countries in group A have wide swings between autocracy and 
democracy (Figure 5A), highlighting the instability in governance in these countries. On the 
contrary, countries in group B portray somewhat stable and democratic leaning governance 
(Figure 5B). 
IV. Conclusion
Following the discussion above, there is suggestive evidence that countries in group B have a 
relatively better developed financial market compared to those in group A. Studies such as Beck 
(2002, 2003) and Hur et al (2006) found evidence in support of Kletzer and Bardhan (1987) 
hypothesis that financial development cause trade in industries with scale economies. Similarly, 
studies focusing on the relationship between financial development and trade in general (Huang 
and Temple, 2003 and Svaleryd and Valchos, 2002) also found that financial development 
positively caused an increase in trade openness. Our analysis above and the results of the 
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causality tests points to Kletzer and Bardhan (1987) hypothesis and confirms the empirical
findings that countries in which the financial sector is relatively developed, trade in industries 
with scale economies will expand. 
The evidence presented in the discussion above, shows that the financial sector of countries in 
group A is relatively less developed. However, it does not explain why the causality in these 
countries runs from trade to financial development. Some studies have suggested that the trade-
financial development relationship maybe demand driven. In other words, countries in group A 
may have highly specialized sectors with scale economies or more tangible assets, causing an 
increase in demand for external financing. 
As previously established, group A countries are highly specialized; mainly in oil, non-fuel 
primary products and services. So exactly what explains the trade-finance relationship? It is often 
argued that FDI inflows increase domestic financial resources, boost export competitiveness and 
enhances technological capabilities among other factors (UNCTAD, 1999). Historically, the flow 
of FDI to African countries has been driven by the availability of natural resources (oil and 
minerals). To establish any unique characteristics in FDI flows between the two groups of 
countries, we track trends in FDI flows as a percentage of total trade in merchandise and services 
for the period of 1970-2010. Figure 6A shows steady positive trends for countries in group A 
relative to those in group B (Figure 6B). This steady flow of FDI in group A indicates that FDI 
may be the driver of financial sector development. 
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APPENDIX
Table 1:  Granger causality test results for selected African countries
Granger causality test specifications for:  Financial Development (FD) and Manufactured 
Exports (ME)
Manufactured Exports  does not Granger cause Financial Development (4 lags)
Group A countries F-statistic Probability
Burkina Faso 3.77 0.042
Ivory Coast 4.58 0.033
Ethiopia 6.39 0.031
Lesotho 3.91 0.047
Libya 9.28 0.006
Niger 4.01 0.036
Liberia 3.09 0.037
Financial Development does not Granger cause Manufactured Exports (4 lags)
Group B Countries F- statistic Probability
Burundi 6.21 0.002
Chad 3.66 0.031
Gabon 2.97 0.045
Kenya 5.72 0.008
Liberia 4.88 0.039
Mauritius 3.35 0.052
Morocco 9.47 0.006
Sierra Leone 2 .9 0.053
South Africa 6.39 0.014
Tanzania 7.41 0.027
Note: All Causality tests employ four lags. We report the joint probability of rejecting the null 
hypothesis. We only report the results for tests that are significant at the 5% level or better. We 
do not show the results for the eleven countries that did not have significant results but they are 
available from the authors.
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Table  2: Legal Origin, Type of Exports and Export Diversification
GROUP A
British legal 
Origin
French Legal 
Origin
exporters 
of nonfuel 
primary 
products
exporters 
of fuels 
(mainly 
oil)
exporters 
of services
diversified 
exporters
Burkina Faso 0 1 0 0 1 0
Cote d'Ivoire 0 1 1 0 0 0
Ethiopia 0 0 1 0 0 0
Lesotho 1 0 0 0 1 0
Libya 0 1 0 1 0 0
Niger 0 1 1 0 0 0
Nigeria 1 0 0 1 0 0
GROUP B
Burundi 0 1 1 0 0 0
Central African 
Republic 0 1 0 0 0 1
Chad 0 1 1 0 0 0
Gabon 0 1 0 1 0 0
Kenya 1 0 0 0 0 1
Liberia 0 0 1 0 0 0
Mauritius 0 1 0 0 0 1
Morocco 0 1 0 0 0 1
Sierra Leone 1 0 0 0 0 1
South Africa 1 0 0 0 0 1
Tanzania 1 0 1 0 0 0
Note: Values provided take a value of one (1) if the country possesses the characteristics 
described by the variable and zero (0) otherwise.
Source: Global Development Network Growth Database, 2012
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Table 3: Percentage Change in Financial Development Indicators (1990-2010)
Group A
Domestic 
credit to 
private sector 
(% of GDP) 
Money 
and quasi 
money 
(M2) as % 
of GDP Group B
Domestic 
credit to 
private 
sector (% of 
GDP) 
Money and 
quasi money 
(M2) as % of 
GDP 
Burkina 
Faso -2.04 9.41 Burundi 158.49 92.99
Cote 
d'Ivoire -60.55 -15.69
Central African 
Rep -3.55 7.75
Ethiopia 63.82 18.89 Chad -51.30 -47.54
Lesotho -48.00 -7.98 Kenya -20.62 37.06
Niger 52.09 21.77 Mauritius 127.70 72.09
Nigeria 188.49 79.00 South Africa 71.32 25.38
Tanzania -26.77 36.68
Source: Authors own calculation based on World Development Indicators dataset, 2012
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Source: Author’s calculations based on UNCTADStat database, 2013.
Source: Author’s own calculations based on UNCTAD database, 2012
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Figure 1: Africa's Exports of Manufactured Goods (1995 - 2011, in 
Thousands USD)
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Source: Authors own calculations based on UNCTAD database, 2012
Source: Author’s own calculations based on World Development Indicator database, 2012
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Figure 2.2A: Export product diversification index
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Figure 2.1B: Export product concentration index
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Source: Author’s own calculations based on World Development Indicators database, 2012
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Source: Author’s own calculations based on World Development Indicators database, 2012
Source: Author’s own calculations based on World Development Indicators database, 2012
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Source: Authors own calculations based on UNCTAD database, 2012
Source: Authors own calculations based on UNCTAD database, 2012
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Figure 4.1A: Manufactures output with low skill and technology 
intensity (as a % of total Manufactures output). 
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Figure 4.2A: Manufactures  Output with medium skill and 
technology intensity as a (% of total Manufactures output) 
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Source: Authors own calculations based on UNCTAD database, 2012
Source: Authors own calculations based on UNCTAD database, 2012
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Figure 4.3A: Manufactures  output with High Skill and Technology 
Intensity (% of total Manufactures output)
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Figure 4.1B: Manufactures output with low skill and technology 
intensity (as a % of total Manufactures output). 
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Source: Authors own calculations based on UNCTAD database, 2012
Source: Authors own calculations based on UNCTAD database, 2012
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technology intensity (as a % of total Manufactures output)  
Burundi
CAR
Chad
Gabon
Kenya
Liberia
Mauritius
Morocco
SA
TZ
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
Figure 4.3B: Manufactures  output with High Skill and Technology 
Intensity (% of total Manufactures output)
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Source: Author’s own calculations based on Polity IV project database, 2012
Source: Author’s own calculations based on Polity IV project database, 2012
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Figure 5A: Polity2  Index (-10 = Highly autocratic; 10= Highly 
democratic
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Figure 5B: Polity2  Index (-10 = Highly autocratic; 10= Highly 
democratic
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Source: Author’s own calculations based on World Development Indicators database, 2012
Source: Author’s own calculations based on World Development Indicators database, 2012
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Figure 6A: FDI as Percentage of total trade in merchandise and 
services
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Figure 6B: FDI as a Percentage of total trade in merchandise and 
services
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